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TC Heartland: It’s Time to Take Stock 
 
DANIEL KAZHDAN & SANJIV P. LAUD* 
INTRODUCTION 
It has been a little over a year and a half since the Supreme Court issued its groundbreaking 
venue decision in TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC,1 shaking up the status 
quo in U.S. patent infringement litigation.  The first months after TC Heartland saw a flurry of 
activity as litigants and courts wrestled with the impact of the decision on pending cases, pondered 
the true meaning of a “regular and established place of business,” and explored many other 
questions left by the TC Heartland decision.  Eighteen months and several writs of mandamus 
later, it is now a good time to take stock of the newly emerging status quo in patent venue.  This 
article does just that.   
The article proceeds in four parts:  First, it reviews the history and holding of the Supreme 
Court’s TC Heartland decision.  Second, it reviews the Federal Circuit’s many decisions 
implementing TC Heartland and addressing divisions among the district courts.  Third, the article 
outlines some of the remaining divisions among district courts.  Finally, it looks at some statistics 
on how the change in venue law impacted courts since the TC Heartland decision. 
 
I. THE SUPREME COURT’S TC HEARTLAND DECISION 
The patent venue statute allows an action for patent infringement to be brought “in the 
judicial district where the defendant resides, or where the defendant has committed acts of 
infringement and has a regular and established place of business.”2 In 1957, the Supreme Court 
held in Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products Corporation that a company “resides,” for these 
purposes, in its state of incorporation alone, rather than in all districts where it is incorporated, 
licensed to do business, or doing business, as was then true for most purposes.3   
In 1990, the Federal Circuit held that Congress had abrogated the Supreme Court’s Fourco 
decision by amending other sections of Title 28 that applied to corporations in general.4 The court 
relied on the 1988 amendments to section 1391, which provided that, “[f]or purposes of venue 
under this chapter, a defendant that is a corporation shall be deemed to reside in any judicial district 
in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced.”5 According to 
VE Holding, section 1391(c)’s definition of “reside” applied to section 1400, so “venue in a patent 
infringement case includes any district where there would be personal jurisdiction over the 
                                                 
* The authors are both associates at Jones Day.  The views and opinions set forth herein, however, are the personal 
views and opinions of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect views or opinions of Jones Day.  The authors wish 
to thank Gregory A. Castanias, Dr. Aaron Gurwitz, and Dr. Prakash Laud for their help.  The authors also wish to 
thank Docket Navigator for providing the statistical tools and the necessary permissions that enabled Section IV. 
1 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017) (decided May 22, 2017). 
2 28 U.S.C.A. § 1400(b) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-231). 
3 Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222 (1957). 
4 VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1990), abrogated by TC Heartland, 
137 S. Ct. 1514. 
5 28 U.S.C.A. § 1391(c) (1988) (current version at 28 U.S.C.A. § 1391 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-244)). 
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corporate defendant at the time the action is commenced.”6 The upshot of VE Holding was that 
defendants generally had no reason to challenge venue.  If personal jurisdiction existed, then so 
did venue.  If personal jurisdiction did not exist, then a defendant could seek dismissal or transfer 
on that ground.  VE Holding remained the law for 27 years.   
As now PTO director Andre Iancu pointed out in 2011, the Eastern District of Texas 
experienced a “meteoric rise in popularity for litigating patent cases” under the venue rule 
announced by VE Holding.7 Defendants often tried to have their cases transferred from that district, 
but they were largely unsuccessful.8 By 2016, “nearly half of all patent infringement cases filed 
nationwide” were filed in the Eastern District of Texas.9 
That all changed with TC Heartland.  On January 14, 2014, Kraft Foods Group Brands 
LLC sued TC Heartland LLC in the District of Delaware alleging that TC Heartland infringed its 
patents by selling a fruit drink package.  TC Heartland filed a motion to dismiss for lack of venue, 
suggesting that VE Holding was wrong when decided and was certainly overruled when Congress 
amended Section 1391 to remove the “under this chapter” provision.  Magistrate Judge Burke 
issued a thirty-page report and recommendation concluding that VE Holding remained good law,10 
and Judge Stark adopted that ruling.11 TC Heartland unsuccessfully petitioned the Federal Circuit 
for mandamus.12 
On December 14, 2016, the Supreme Court granted certiorari,13 and on May 22, 2017, it 
issued its decision.  The Supreme Court found that VE Holding was wrong when it was decided, 
and that, “[a]s applied to domestic corporations, ‘residence’ in § 1400(b) refers only to the State 
of incorporation.”14 Other than reviving Fourco, the Supreme Court offered little guidance on how 
venue questions should be decided.  It expressly declined to decide how to deal with 
unincorporated or foreign entities.15 
One month after the Supreme Court’s decision, the parties dismissed the TC Heartland 
case with prejudice.16 Apparently, no one told the Federal Circuit.  A month after the suit was 
dismissed, the Federal Circuit remanded the case to the district court “to consider in the first 
instance whether transfer is appropriate.”17 
 
                                                 
6 917 F.2d at 1583. 
7 Andrei Iancu & Jay Chung, Real Reasons the Eastern District of Texas Draws Patent Cases-Beyond Lore and 
Anecdote, 14 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 299, 319 (2011). 
8 Id. at 314.   
9 R. Trevor Carter, Trenton B. Morton & Reid E. Dodge, Developments in Intellectual Property Law: October 1, 
2015 - September 30, 2016, 50 IND. L. REV. 1281, 1293 (2017) (citing sources). 
10 Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC v. TC Heartland, LLC, No. CV 14-28-LPS, 2015 WL 4778828 (D. Del. Aug. 13, 
2015). 
11 Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC v. TC Heartland, LLC, No. CV 14-28-LPS, 2015 WL 5613160 (D. Del. Sept. 24, 
2015). 
12 In re TC Heartland LLC, 821 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
13 TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Food Brands Grp. LLC, 137 S. Ct. 614 (2016). 
14 TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514,1520, 1521 (2017). 
15 See id. at 1517 n.1, 1520 n.2. 
16 See Order Granting Agreed Motion to Dismiss, Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC v. TC Heartland, LLC, No. 1:14-
cv-28 (D. Del. June 23, 2017), ECF No. 474. 
17 Order Remanding to Dist. Court,  Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC v. TC Heartland, LLC, No. 1:14-cv-28 (D. Del. 
July 26, 2017), ECF No. 476. 
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II. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S POST-TC HEARTLAND VENUE DECISIONS 
For all its impact, TC Heartland left open numerous questions.  The pre-VE Holding 
caselaw was dated and not all that easy to apply:  Methods of conducting commerce have 
drastically changed in the last three decades, and, besides, much of the pre-VE Holding appellate 
caselaw came from the regional circuits and not the Federal Circuit, which was created in 1982.  
Thus, the Federal Circuit and the district courts had a lot of ground to make up. 
This section summarizes the Federal Circuit’s post-TC Heartland decisions, and the next 
section selects some interesting district court decisions that have issued in that time. 
 
A. The Early Cases 
 
Within days of TC Heartland, defendants in patent infringement cases started petitioning 
for writs of mandamus seeking to have cases transferred.  At first, the Federal Circuit was reluctant 
to grant these writs.  In In re Sea Ray Boats, Inc.,18 the district court had found that the defendants 
waived their venue challenge by raising it too late.  The defendants then sought mandamus from 
the Federal Circuit, but the Federal Circuit refused, stressing the high burden for receiving 
mandamus.  Over Judge Newman’s dissent, the Court laconically concluded that, “[u]nder the 
circumstances, the court declines to grant mandamus relief.”19   
There followed a series of similar cases, where a district court found that a defendant 
waived its venue challenge, and the Federal Circuit refused to grant mandamus relying, in part, on 
the high burden for receiving mandamus.20 Foreshadowing a later development, however, the 
Federal Circuit noted in Techtronic that the venue challenge could be raised on appeal.21 
 
B. Cray 
 
The Federal Circuit’s first post-TC Heartland foray into venue was In re Cray Inc.,22 where 
it addressed section 1400’s provision that venue is proper “where the defendant has committed 
acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of business.”23  At issue was the 
definition of “regular and established place of business.”  Cray is a company with no offices in the 
Eastern District of Texas.  However, it allowed two employees to work from home in the district.  
Judge Gilstrap held that venue was proper.24  As part of that analysis, he ruled that “a fixed physical 
location in the district is not a prerequisite to proper venue.”25 The Federal Circuit reversed, setting 
out three requirements for showing “a regular and established place of business”: “(1) there must 
be a physical place in the district; (2) it must be a regular and established place of business; and 
                                                 
18 695 F. App’x 543 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (decided June 9, 2017). 
19 Id. at 544. 
20 See In re Nintendo, Inc., No. 2017-127, 2017 WL 4581670 (Fed. Cir. July 26, 2017); In re Techtronic Indus. N. 
Am., Inc., No. 2017-125, 2017 WL 4685333 (Fed. Cir. July 25, 2017); In re Hughes Network Sys., LLC, No. 2017-
130, 2017 WL 3167522 (Fed. Cir. July 24, 2017).  
21 2017 WL 4685333, at *1. 
22 871 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (decided September 21, 2017). 
23 28 U.S.C.A. § 1400 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-231). 
24 Raytheon Co. v. Cray, Inc., 258 F. Supp. 3d 781, 799 (E.D. Tex. 2017). 
25Id. at 797. 
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(3) it must be the place of the defendant.”26 “[A] virtual space” was not enough.27 The Federal 
Circuit held that Cray’s employees’ homes were insufficient, because they were not properly 
attributable to Cray.28 It ordered the district court to transfer the case. 
Applying Cray, district courts have held that the following are insufficient to show a 
“regular and established place of business”: employees having home offices in the district;29 
defendants being registered to do business in the district;30 defendants having subsidiaries in the 
district—so long as corporate formalities are maintained; 31  defendants renting a shelf in the 
district;32 and defendants having sales representatives in the district.33 
 
C. Micron and Similar Cases 
 
The Federal Circuit’s next venture into venue law was to decide a deep district-court split 
about whether the Supreme Court’s TC Heartland decision constitutes a change of law that 
forgives waiver.  Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(g)(2) and 12(h)(1), a defendant waives 
its right to challenge venue if it files a different Rule 12 motion or responsive pleading without 
challenging venue.  Rule 12(g)(2), however, only creates waiver for venue challenges that were 
“available.”  District courts were deeply divided on whether a venue challenge was available to 
defendants pre-TC Heartland.  On the one hand, there was nothing stopping defendants from 
raising such challenges, just as TC Heartland had.  On the other hand, there had been 27 years of 
Federal Circuit law that was uniform in applying VE Holding.  In Micron, the district court ruled 
that such defenses were “available,” so Micron’s failure to challenge venue waived the challenge.  
Micron petitioned for mandamus. 
The Federal Circuit granted the petition. 34  It held that the venue challenge was not 
“available” until TC Heartland.  Before then, the district court was bound by VE Holding.  
However, the Federal Circuit added an important caveat:  “[D]istrict courts have authority to find 
forfeiture of a venue objection” independent of Rule 12, although their “authority must be 
exercised with caution.”35 The Federal Circuit therefore remanded the case to the district court to 
consider in the first instance.  The district court transferred the case to Delaware, Micron’s state of 
incorporation.36 
The Federal Circuit then remanded a number of other cases in light of Micron:  Most of 
the cases were ones where the district court had found waiver, and the defendant moved for 
                                                 
26 Cray, 871 F.3d at 1360.   
27 Id. at 1362.   
28 Id. at 1364–65.   
29 Personal Audio, LLC v. Google, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 3d 922, 935–36 (E.D. Tex. 2017). 
30 BillingNetwork Patent, Inc. v. Modernizing Med., Inc., No. 17-C-5636, 2017 WL 5146008, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 
6, 2017). 
31 EMED Techs. Corp. v. Repro-Med Sys., Inc., No. 2:17-cv-728-WCB-RSP, 2018 WL 2544564, at *2–3 (E.D. Tex. 
June 4, 2018) (Bryson, J., sitting by designation). 
32 Peerless Network, Inc. v. Blitz Telecom Consulting, LLC, No. 17-cv-1725-JPO, 2018 WL 1478047, at *4–5 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2018). 
33 Order Granting Motion to Transfer Venue, Edgewell Personal Care Brands, LLC v. Munchkin, Inc., No. 3:16-cv-
00094-VLB (D. Conn. Mar. 29, 2018), ECF No. 75. 
34 In re Micron Tech., Inc., 875 F.3d 1091 (Fed. Cir.  2017). 
35 Id. at 1101.   
36 Order Transferring the Case to U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of Del., President & Fellows of Harvard Coll. v. 
Micron Tech., Inc., Doc. 166 (D. Mass. Nov. 30, 2017).. 
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mandamus relief.37 In one case, though, the Federal Circuit recalled a transfer where a district court 
categorically found no waiver without considering non-Rule 12 bases for forfeiture.38 In all but 
one of these cases, the district court dismissed or transferred the case.39  
Yahoo!40 is the one exception.  Judge Glasser refused to reconsider his decision that Yahoo 
waived its venue defense by not raising it pre-TC Heartland, primarily because he found that the 
Federal Circuit’s Micron decision was wrong.  TC Heartland, he maintained, was not a change in 
law and the venue defense was “available” even before the Supreme Court’s decision.  Not 
surprisingly, the Federal Circuit issued a writ of mandamus telling the district court to dismiss or 
transfer.41 
 
D. HTC 
 
A number of companies sued HTC Corp., a Taiwanese company, and HTC America for 
patent infringement in the District of Delaware.42 HTC Corp. and HTC America moved to dismiss 
for improper venue.  The district court granted HTC America’s motion, but it ruled that HTC 
Corp., as “a foreign defendant[,] may be sued in any judicial district.”43   
HTC Corp. petitioned for mandamus, but the Federal Circuit denied the petition for two 
reasons.  It first relied on the high burden for petitions for mandamus.  The possibility of an 
unnecessary trial, the Federal Circuit ruled, was not enough.44 Nonetheless, the Federal Circuit 
proceeded to analyze the merits at length.  It concluded that a foreign defendant can be sued 
anywhere.45 
 
E. ZTE 
 
Notwithstanding the court’s suggestion in HTC that mandamus is generally unnecessary 
for venue challenges, it was not long before the Federal Circuit issued more mandamus decisions.  
American GNC Corp. sued ZTE (USA) Inc. for patent infringement in the Eastern District of 
Texas.  ZTE moved for dismissal for improper venue.  The magistrate recommended denying the 
motion.46 It held that ZTE had the burden of proving that venue was improper and that ZTE failed 
                                                 
37 See In re Flopam Inc., 707 F. App’x 704 (Fed. Cir. 2017); In re Carbonite, Inc., 707 F. App’x 704 (Fed. Cir. 
2017); In re Yahoo Holdings Inc., 705 F. App’x 955 (Fed. Cir. 2017); In re Asustek Computer Inc., 705 F. App’x 
956 (Fed. Cir. 2017); In re DECA Int’l Corp., 705 F. App’x 955 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
38 In re Cutsforth, Inc., No. 2017-135, 2017 WL 5907556 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 15, 2017). 
39 See SkyHawke Techs., LLC v. DECA Int’l Corp., No. 3:10-cv-708 Doc. 175 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 30, 2018); 
Cutsforth, Inc. v. LEMM Liquidating Co., No. 12-1200 Doc. 443 (D. Minn. Feb. 13, 2018); Koninklijke Philips 
N.V. v. Asustek Computer, Inc., No. 15-1125 Doc. 366 (D. Del. Mar. 27, 2018); Realtime Data LLC v. Carbonite, 
Inc., No. 6:17-cv-00121 Doc. 85 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 18, 2017); BASF Corp. v. SNF Holding Co., No. 4:14-cv-2733 
Doc. 288 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 19, 2017) (on remand from Flopam). 
40 See AlmondNet, Inc. v. Yahoo! Inc., No. 16-cv-1557, 2018 WL 3998021 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2018). 
41 See In re Oath Holdings Inc., No. 2018-157, 2018 WL 5930405 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 14, 2018). It transferred. See 
AlmondNet, No. 16-cv-1557 ECF 129 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2018). 
42 In re HTC Corp., 889 F.3d 1349, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
43 3G Licensing, S.A. v. HTC Corp., No. CV 17-83-LPS-CJB, 2017 WL 6442101, at *2 (D. Del. Dec. 18, 2017). 
44 HTC, 889 F.3d at 1352–54.   
45 Id. at 1354–61. 
46 Am. GNC Corp. v. ZTE Corp., No. 4:17-cv-00620-ALM-KPJ, 2017 WL 5163605, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 4, 2017). 
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to meet its burden.47 Although the finding that ZTE failed to meet its burden was the magistrate’s 
primary basis for denying ZTE’s motion, the magistrate also noted that ZTE contracted with a call 
center in the district, and the contracted company was in the district.48 ZTE objected, but the 
district court denied ZTE’s objections.49 
The Federal Circuit granted ZTE’s petition for mandamus.50 At the threshold, it held that 
the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that venue is proper (resolving a district court split).51 On 
the merits, the Federal Circuit held that the lower court had not sufficiently justified its conclusion 
that the third-party’s activities in the district could be attributed to ZTE.52 It remanded on that 
issue. 
 
F. BigCommerce 
 
BigCommerce addresses where a corporation “resides” if it is incorporated in a multi-
district state.53 BigCommerce, Inc. is incorporated in Texas.  Its registered office and headquarters 
are in Austin, Texas, which is in the Western District of Texas.  A number of companies sued 
BigCommerce in the Eastern District of Texas.  BigCommerce argued that venue was improper, 
but the district court ruled that a company that is incorporated in a multi-district state can be sued 
in any district in that state. Other district courts disagreed.54   
The Federal Circuit granted mandamus.  It emphasized that Section 1400 talks about venue 
being proper in the specific “judicial district,” not in a state.55 BigCommerce therefore held that a 
defendant resides “only in the single judicial district within [a] state where it maintains a principal 
place of business.”56 If it does not maintain a principal place of business in the state, then venue is 
proper in “the judicial district in which its registered office is located.”  Id.  The Federal Circuit 
therefore concluded that venue was not proper in the Eastern District of Texas. 
 
III. SPLITS BETWEEN DISTRICT COURTS 
Since TC Heartland, there have been a number of district-court splits.  The Federal Circuit 
has made liberal use of mandamus writs to resolve splits as they arise, but a few remain.  Many 
potential splits are highly fact dependent and are therefore hard to pin down.  However, there are 
a few notable legal disputes addressed below. 
 
A. Where Do “Acts of Infringement” Take Place in ANDA Cases? 
 
                                                 
47 Id. at *2–4. 
48 Id. at *4. 
49 Am. GNC Corp. v. ZTE Corp., No. 4:17CV620, 2017 WL 5157700 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 7, 2017). 
50 In re ZTE (USA) Inc., 890 F.3d 1008 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
51 Id. at 1013–14.   
52 Id. at 1014–15. 
53 In re BigCommerce, Inc., 890 F.3d 978 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
54 See id. at 981 (citing cases). 
55 Id. at 982–84 
56 Id. at 986. 
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Litigations between innovator and generic drug companies proceed somewhat differently 
from other patent litigations.  Under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e), the innovator drug company can usually 
sue the generic drug company for “submit[ting]” an ANDA application but not for most other pre-
submission actions.  If the defendant does not reside in the district, the question is where has the 
defendant “committed acts of infringement” at the time it files its FDA application?   
One possibility is Maryland, where the FDA is situated, which is the location to which the 
ANDA is submitted.  However, in Zeneca Ltd. v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,57 the Federal 
Circuit—in a very fractured decision, where Judge Gajarsa wrote the opinion for the Court, Judge 
Rader concurred in judgment, and Judge Rich dissented—held that a generic drug manufacturer’s 
filing of a drug application with the FDA did not create personal jurisdiction over the generic drug 
company in Maryland.  If that personal-jurisdiction analysis applies to venue as well, the generic’s 
filing of an application with the FDA would not count as committing “acts of infringement” in 
Maryland for purposes of Section 1400.58 Another possibility is that the “submi[ssion]” occurs in 
the location from which the ANDA was submitted.59 Either approach would allow only a plaintiff 
to sue in only a very limited number of locations. 
In Bristol-Myers Squibb, however, Judge Stark ruled that venue in ANDA cases is actually 
far broader.  Instead of looking only at the acts the defendant has committed already, Judge Stark 
looked to the acts that the generic “intends to take”—including, frequently, nationwide 
marketing.60  Thus, he held that if Mylan had a regular and established place of business in 
Delaware (which he later found it did not61), it could be sued there based on its intent to sell drugs 
everywhere in the United States, including Delaware.  At least one other district court adopted this 
approach.62 
However, Judge Lynn of the Northern District of Texas disagrees.63 She sees the statute’s 
requirement that the venue be one “‘where the defendant has committed acts of infringement’” as 
unambiguously looking to past acts:  The acts of infringement that the generic intends to commit 
are simply irrelevant.64 Thus, the generic company in that case could not be sued in the district, 
notwithstanding its intent to market a drug in the district. 
 
B. Must the “Acts of Infringement” Relate to the “Place of Business”? 
 
In Seven Networks, LLC v. Google, LLC, Judge Gilstrap held that the “acts of infringement” 
need not be related to the “regular and established place of business.”65 As Seven Networks notes, 
that was the subject of a district-court split in the mid-twentieth century.66  Google petitioned for 
                                                 
57 173 F.3d 829 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
58 Cf. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., No. CV 17-379-LPS, 2017 WL 3980155, at *11 & n.13 (D. 
Del. Sept. 11, 2017) (not deciding whether Zeneca applies to venue issues).   
59 Cf. id. at *11 (noting that a defendant raised this possibility). 
60 Id. at *13. 
61 See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., No. CV 17-374-LPS, 2018 WL 5109836 (D. Del. Oct. 18, 
2018). 
62 See Celgene Corp. v. Hetero Labs Ltd., No. 17-3387, 2018 WL 1135334, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 2, 2018) (citing a 
number of Delaware cases). 
63 See Galderma Labs, L.P. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 290 F. Supp. 3d 599 (N.D. Tex. 2017). 
64 Id. at 607 (emphasis in original) (quoting Bristol-Myers Squibb, 2017 WL 39080 155, at *12). 
65 315 F. Supp. 3d. 933, 946 (E.D. Tex. 2018). 
66 Id. (citing cases). 
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mandamus, but the Federal Circuit denied the writ. 67   Although the Federal Circuit did not 
conclusively bless Judge Gilstrap’s approach, it concluded that there was no “clear and 
indisputable error.”68 
 
C. Must a “Regular and Established Place of Business” Have an Employee at the Location? 
 
District courts are split as to whether an inanimate object, like a computer server, can itself 
constitute a “regular and established place of business” for venue purposes.  Some courts have 
held that Section 1400(b) requires a human employee or agent to be in the district.69 Judge Gilstrap 
disagreed.70  
 
D. When Must the Defendant Have a “Regular and Established Place of Business” in the 
District? 
 
District courts are split on whether a defendant must have a “regular and established place 
of business” at the time the patentee files a complaint or whether it is sufficient if it had one a 
reasonable time beforehand.  This dispute traces its origin back to Welch Scientific Co. v. Human 
Engineering Institute, Inc., where the court summarized the various positions.71 Welch sued the 
Human Engineering Institute (“HEI”) in an Illinois district court for infringing its patents. HEI was 
an Ohio company, and it alleged that it no longer had a regular and established place of business 
at the time the complaint was filed.  The Seventh Circuit disagreed, finding that venue is proper 
“if the defendant had a regular and established place of business at the time the cause of action 
accrued and suit is filed within a reasonable time thereafter.”72 As Welch itself notes, the question 
of when to assess venue in non-patent cases was hotly disputed even then.73 
That dispute has resurfaced post-TC Heartland.  A number of courts agree with Welch that 
venue is proper so long as the patentee sued within a “reasonable” time after the cause of action 
accrued.74 Other courts, however, hold that the defendant must have a “regular and established 
place of business” in the district at the time of suit.75 
 
                                                 
67 In re Google LLC, No. 2018-152, 2018 WL 5536478 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 29, 2018). 
68 Id. at *3. 
69 Peerless Network, Inc. v. Blitz Telecom Consulting, LLC, No. 17-cv-1725 (JPO), 2018 WL 1478047, at *4 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2018). 
70 Seven Networks, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 961 (after citing Peerless). 
71 416 F.2d 32 (7th Cir. 1969).  
72 Id. at 35 (emphasis added). 
73 Id. at 35 n.2 (citing cases and sources). 
74 See Precision Fabrics Grp., Inc. v. Tietex Int’l, Ltd., No. 1:13-cv-645, 2017 WL 5176355, at *10 n.15 (M.D.N.C. 
Nov. 7, 2017); Free-Flow Packaging Int'l, Inc. v. Automated Packaging Sys., Inc., No. 17-cv-01803, 2017 WL 
4155347, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2017); Raytheon Co. v. Cray, Inc., 258 F. Supp. 3d 781, 787–88 (E.D. Tex. 
2017), vacated sub nom. on other grounds In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2017).   
75 See See Infinity Comput. Prod., Inc. v. OKI Data Ams., Inc., No. 12-6797, 2018 WL 1035793, at *10 (E.D. Pa. 
Feb. 23, 2018); Pers. Audio, LLC v. Google, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 3d 922 (E.D. Tex. 2017); see also Incipio, LLC v. 
Argento SC, No. 17-01974 (C.D. Cal. July 18, 2018) (collecting cases). 
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E. Do Computer Servers Counts as a “Regular and Established Place of Business”? 
 
Although this is a very specific disagreement, it is interesting that judges within the Eastern 
District of Texas itself are split on whether Google’s servers in that district create a regular and 
established place for Google’s business.  In Seven Networks, Judge Gilstrap held they did based 
on a number of case-specific facts, expressly disagreeing with Judge Clarke’s earlier ruling that 
they were not.76  Judge Lynn of the Northern District of Texas agrees with Judge Clarke.77  The 
Federal Circuit noted this disagreement, but, over a dissent by Judge Reyna, it found that the issue 
was too case-specific to merit the drastic remedy of mandamus.78 
 
IV. VENUE POST-HEARTLAND, BY THE NUMBERS 
As expected, the Heartland decision has had a major impact on patent litigation venues 
around the country.  The biggest impact by far fell on the Eastern District of Texas.  In 2015, prior 
to Heartland, the Eastern District received a whopping 44% of all new patent cases filed in United 
States district courts.  The pace of filings slowed only slightly since then, and, in the eighteen 
months immediately prior to Heartland, over 37% of all new cases nationwide were filed in the 
Eastern District of Texas, more than triple the share of the next busiest court, the District of 
Delaware.  In the eighteen months after Heartland, filings in the Eastern District fell by two thirds 
to just 14% of all cases nationwide.  While that was still enough to make the Eastern District of 
Texas the second busiest court in the country for new cases, it was a remarkable decline from years 
past.79 
The District of Delaware also felt a significant impact from the Heartland decision.  In the 
eighteen months after the decision, case filings more than doubled over the eighteen months prior.  
Already a popular venue, the District of Delaware now sees roughly 24% of all patent cases filed 
nationwide—more than any other court.  This likely reflects the fact that so many companies are 
incorporated in the single-district state of Delaware, making it easy to establish venue there in 
many cases.  Numbers were also up in the Northern and Central Districts of California, with the 
Northern District doubling its share from 4.1% to 8.4% of cases nationwide and the Central District 
rising from 6.2% to 8.8% of cases nationwide.   
Filings were mostly stable in the next several busiest courts, with modest increases or 
decreases in the Northern District of Illinois, District of New Jersey, Southern District of Florida, 
and District of Massachusetts.   
One interesting effect of Heartland was a significant uptick in case filings in Texas courts 
other than the Eastern District.  In the eighteen months before Heartland, the Northern, Southern, 
and Western Districts of Texas each saw between 56 and 79 patent cases.  That represented 
approximately 1% of cases filed nationwide each and some 30 to 40 times fewer than the Eastern 
District.  In the eighteen months after Heartland, the Northern, Southern, and Western Districts 
                                                 
76 2018 WL 3634589, at *11-12 (disagreeing with Pers. Audio, LLC v. Google, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 3d at 933). 
77 Cupp Cybersecurity LLC v. Symantec Corp., No. 3:18-cv-1554 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 16, 2019). 
78 In re Google LLC, 2018 WL 5536478 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 29, 2018). 
79 Interestingly, the Federal Circuit’s decision in Cray seems to have had little effect on the district.  Between when 
the Supreme Court decided TC Heartland (May 22, 2017) and when the Federal Circuit decided Cray (Sept. 21, 
2017), 12.1% of cases nationwide were filed in Eastern District of Texas.  Since Cray, that number remains mostly 
unchanged.  12.3% of cases were filed there. 
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each saw between 90 and 138 new patent cases, an increase of roughly 75%.  Does this suggest 
that patent plaintiffs have an abiding taste for Texas justice even after the Heartland decision?  
Will the other Texas districts continue to rise as the Eastern District falls?  Only time will tell. 
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STATISTICAL APPENDIX 
This appendix is intended for readers who are mathematically inclined and are interested 
in a more detailed look at the statistics around venue post-TC Heartland.  We begin by presenting 
our data and explaining our analysis supporting the conclusions stated in the main piece.  We end 
by drawing some tentative conclusions about the significance of TC Heartland’s impact. 
To assess TC Heartland’s impact on courts around the country, we focused on the nine 
busiest patent venues during the year prior to the decision: the Eastern District of Texas, District 
of Delaware, Central District of California, Northern District of California, Northern District of 
Illinois, District of New Jersey, Southern District of Florida, Southern District of New York, and 
District of Massachusetts.  To demonstrate the disproportionate number of cases filed in the 
Eastern District of Texas, we also gathered data on the much sleepier Northern, Southern, and 
Western Districts of Texas.  For each court we studied, we used Docket Navigator to determine 
the number of cases filed in the district in calendar years 2008 through 2016, and for the year 
immediately prior to the Heartland decision (May 23, 2016 – May 22, 2017) and for the year 
immediately after the decision (May 23, 2017 – May 22, 2018).80  These numbers are reflected in 
the table and chart below. 
Table 1.  Cases filed by year. 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
12 mos. 
Pre-TC 
12 mos. 
Post-TC 
All courts 2594 2544 2772 3624 5452 6093 5007 5789 4651 4772 4404 
E.D. Tex. 296 236 287 422 1252 1499 1428 2553 1678 1646 528 
D. Del. 167 232 254 486 1001 1335 942 544 459 559 907 
C.D. Cal. 198 272 218 318 506 411 320 278 293 300 398 
N.D. Cal. 164 161 175 221 257 246 250 220 196 176 324 
N.D. Ill. 144 133 180 221 239 218 151 162 250 228 241 
D.N.J. 160 146 153 183 160 144 282 270 192 175 211 
S.D. Fla. 33 45 68 66 132 185 112 129 144 119 92 
S.D.N.Y. 108 110 105 152 141 131 117 153 115 109 145 
D. Mass. 50 61 72 87 79 119 54 68 62 103 88 
N.D. Tex. 41 38 41 47 58 78 60 116 55 46 88 
S.D. Tex. 31 35 35 36 43 51 42 39 35 42 74 
W.D. Tex. 14 23 35 42 56 53 51 70 37 55 93 
                                                 
80 Although the pre- and post-TC Heartland statistics in Section IV are based on eighteen months of data each, we 
use twelve-month periods here to better compare the data with past calendar years. 
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We converted each of the numbers above to a relative share of the nationwide caseload, as 
reflected in the table below.  This effectively normalized our data for changes in patent filings 
nationwide.  For example, from 2011 to 2012 the number of patent cases increased 50% 
nationwide, likely due to the America Invents Act, which restricted the joinder of multiple 
defendants in a single action.  See 35 U.S.C. § 299.  Considering each district’s share of the 
nationwide caseload as opposed to the total number of cases allowed us to home in on the relative 
prominence of each district compared to others. 
Table 2.  Share of nationwide caseload 
 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
12 mos. 
Pre-TC 
12 mos. 
Post-TC 
E.D. Tex. 11.41% 9.28% 10.35% 11.64% 22.96% 24.60% 28.52% 44.10% 36.08% 34.49% 11.99% 
D. Del. 6.44% 9.12% 9.16% 13.41% 18.36% 21.91% 18.81% 9.40% 9.87% 11.71% 20.59% 
C.D. Cal. 7.63% 10.69% 7.86% 8.77% 9.28% 6.75% 6.39% 4.80% 6.30% 6.29% 9.04% 
N.D. Cal. 6.32% 6.33% 6.31% 6.10% 4.71% 4.04% 4.99% 3.80% 4.21% 3.69% 7.36% 
N.D. Ill. 5.55% 5.23% 6.49% 6.10% 4.38% 3.58% 3.02% 2.80% 5.38% 4.78% 5.47% 
D.N.J. 6.17% 5.74% 5.52% 5.05% 2.93% 2.36% 5.63% 4.66% 4.13% 3.67% 4.79% 
S.D. Fla. 1.27% 1.77% 2.45% 1.82% 2.42% 3.04% 2.24% 2.23% 3.10% 2.49% 2.09% 
S.D.N.Y. 4.16% 4.32% 3.79% 4.19% 2.59% 2.15% 2.34% 2.64% 2.47% 2.28% 3.29% 
D. Mass. 1.93% 2.40% 2.60% 2.40% 1.45% 1.95% 1.08% 1.17% 1.33% 2.16% 2.00% 
N.D. Tex. 1.58% 1.49% 1.48% 1.30% 1.06% 1.28% 1.20% 2.00% 1.18% 0.96% 2.00% 
S.D. Tex. 1.20% 1.38% 1.26% 0.99% 0.79% 0.84% 0.84% 0.67% 0.75% 0.88% 1.68% 
W.D. Tex. 0.54% 0.90% 1.26% 1.16% 1.03% 0.87% 1.02% 1.21% 0.80% 1.15% 2.11% 
0
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Chart 1.  Cases filed by year (trailing 12 mos.).
E.D. Tex. D. Del. C.D. Cal. N.D. Cal.
TC Heartland 
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A few interesting conclusions can be drawn from these numbers even apart from the impact 
of TC Heartland.  The statistics for the Eastern District of Texas reveal a dramatic rise in the 
court’s share of patent cases nationwide, from around 10% in 2008-11 to more than 33% in 2015 
and 2016.  As shown in Table 3 below, the numbers also show that the Eastern District’s share of 
cases fluctuated considerably from year to year independent of Heartland and the AIA.  In the 
period from 2012 to 2016, for example, the Eastern District’s average share of patent cases was 
31.24% with a standard deviation of 8.77%, 28% of the mean.81  The District of Delaware, Central 
District of California, Northern District of Illinois, District of New Jersey, and District of 
Massachusetts showed similar variability during that time frame. 
 
  
                                                 
81 Standard deviation is a measure of how widely the data in a sample vary from the average.  Higher standard 
deviation means more variance.  If the Eastern District of Texas had exactly a 30% share of nationwide patent cases 
every year, it would have a standard deviation of zero because every year would be the same.  If it alternated yearly 
between 10% and 50%, the average would still be 30% but the standard deviation would be higher. 
Coefficient of variation measures the size of the standard deviation in comparison with the average value.  
Like standard deviation, a higher coefficient of variation means more variance, but two samples with equal standard 
deviations may have different coefficients of variation.  If the Eastern District of Texas alternated yearly between a 
30% and 70% share of patent cases, the standard deviation would be the same as if it alternated between 10% and 
50%; however, the coefficient of variation would be lower in the first case because the variance would be smaller 
compared to the average share of 50%. 
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Chart 2.  Share of nationwide caseload (trailing 12 mos.).
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Table 3.  Share of nationwide caseload – standard deviation and coefficient of variation. 
 
 STD ’08-16 CV ’08-16 STD ’10-16 CV ’10-16 STD ’12-16 CV ’12-16 
E.D. Tex. 12.52% 0.57 12.22% 0.48 8.79% 0.28 
D. Del. 5.45% 0.42 5.25% 0.36 5.68% 0.36 
C.D. Cal. 1.79% 0.23 1.56% 0.22 1.62% 0.24 
N.D. Cal. 1.07% 0.21 0.99% 0.20 0.49% 0.11 
N.D. Ill. 1.34% 0.28 1.49% 0.33 1.06% 0.28 
D.N.J. 1.31% 0.28 1.26% 0.29 1.32% 0.33 
S.D. Fla. 0.59% 0.26 0.46% 0.18 0.43% 0.17 
S.D.N.Y. 0.91% 0.28 0.78% 0.27 0.20% 0.08 
D. Mass. 0.58% 0.32 0.61% 0.36 0.34% 0.24 
N.D. Tex. 0.28% 0.20 0.31% 0.23 0.38% 0.28 
S.D. Tex. 0.25% 0.26 0.20% 0.22 0.07% 0.09 
W.D. Tex. 0.23% 0.23 0.17% 0.17 0.16% 0.16 
To assess the specific effect of the Heartland decision, we computed the percent change in 
share of patent cases, year over year, for each district we studied.  This data is shown in the table 
below.  A few data points jump out.  From 2011 to 2012, nearly every district we studied saw a 
sizeable change in its share of patent cases nationwide.  The Eastern District of Texas alone jumped 
97%.  Similarly, from the year pre-Heartland to the year post-Heartland, most districts we studied 
saw sizeable changes again, with the Eastern District falling by two thirds, the District of Delaware 
increasing by 75%, and the Northern District of California doubling its share.  Large changes in a 
district’s share of patent cases were also relatively commonplace in years not correlated with the 
AIA or the TC Heartland decision; from 2013 to 2014, the District of New Jersey more than 
doubled its share of patent cases with no immediately apparent precipitating cause. 
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Table 4.  Share of nationwide caseload – percent change, year over year. 
 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 Post-TC 
E.D. Tex. -18.70% 11.61% 12.47% 97.21% 7.13% 15.93% 54.63% -18.19% -65.24% 
D. Del. 41.65% 0.48% 46.36% 36.91% 19.34% -14.13% -50.05% 5.02% 75.81% 
C.D. Cal. 40.07% -26.45% 11.58% 5.77% -27.32% -5.25% -24.86% 31.18% 43.75% 
N.D. Cal. 0.10% -0.24% -3.40% -22.70% -14.35% 23.67% -23.89% 10.89% 99.47% 
N.D. Ill. -5.82% 24.21% -6.09% -28.12% -18.38% -15.71% -7.21% 92.08% 14.53% 
D.N.J. -6.96% -3.82% -8.51% -41.88% -19.47% 138.31% -17.19% -11.49% 30.65% 
S.D. Fla. 39.04% 38.68% -25.76% 32.94% 25.41% -26.33% -0.38% 38.94% -16.23% 
S.D.N.Y. 3.85% -12.40% 10.73% -38.34% -16.87% 8.68% 13.10% -6.45% 44.14% 
D. Mass. 24.40% 8.32% -7.57% -39.64% 34.79% -44.78% 8.92% 13.49% -7.42% 
N.D. Tex. -5.50% -0.98% -12.32% -17.97% 20.33% -6.39% 67.22% -40.99% 107.29% 
S.D. Tex. 15.12% -8.23% -21.32% -20.60% 6.13% 0.21% -19.69% 11.70% 90.91% 
W.D. Tex. 67.51% 39.66% -8.21% -11.37% -15.31% 17.10% 18.71% -34.21% 83.22% 
 
These numbers raised a question in our minds:  Are the post-Heartland changes in the 
Eastern District of Texas and the District of Delaware really significant compared to fluctuations 
in prior years?  Or are they just the latest changes in an ever-changing system?  To answer that 
question, we ranked the year-over-year change in each district from 2008 to 2016 and from pre- to 
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Chart 4.  Share of nationwide caseload - percent change, year 
over year.
E.D. Tex. D. Del. C.D. Cal. N.D. Cal.
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post-TC Heartland.  Judged on an absolute logarithmic scale,82 we found that the post-Heartland 
drop in the Eastern District of Texas was the largest annual change in either district during that 
time period, and the post-Heartland increase in the District of Delaware was the fourth largest 
change in either district (as well as the second largest in the District of Delaware after 2014-15).  
These numbers are reflected on the table below. 
 
Table 5.  Biggest annual changes in E.D. Tex. and D. Del. 
Rank Change factor District/Year 
1 2.88 E.D. Tex. Post-Heartland 
2 2.00 D. Del. 2014-15 
3 1.96 E.D. Tex. 2011-12 
4 1.75 D. Del. Post-Heartland 
5 1.55 E.D. Tex. 2014-15 
6 1.46 D. Del. 2010-11 
7 1.42 D. Del. 2008-09 
8 1.36 D. Del. 2011-12 
9 1.23 E.D. Tex. 2008-09 
10 1.22 E.D. Tex. 2015-16 
11 1.19 D. Del. 2012-13 
12 1.16 D. Del. 2013-14 
13 1.16 E.D. Tex. 2013-14 
14 1.13 E.D. Tex. 2010-11 
15 1.12 E.D. Tex. 2009-10 
16 1.07 E.D. Tex. 2012-13 
17 1.05 D. Del. 2015-16 
18 1.00 D. Del. 2009-10 
While it is difficult to draw causal relationships from statistics such as these, it seems likely 
that the extreme changes seen in the Eastern District of Texas and District of Delaware after TC 
Heartland were caused by the decision itself rather than year-to-year fluctuations.  If all 
fluctuations were random, the odds that any given year would have both the first and fourth-most 
significant changes are less than 4%. 
 
                                                 
82 An absolute logarithmic scale treats an increase by a given factor equally with a decrease by the same factor.  So, 
for example, if a district’s share doubled from one year to the next and then fell by half the next, the two changes 
would be considered equal in magnitude.   
